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From 1986 to 1990 Graham Butterworth worked for the 
Department of Miiori Affairs, first as a policy and historical 
adviser, then as Director of Research, and in his last year as 
Historian working jointly with Hepora Young on a history 
of the Departments of Miiori Affairs. He was a resident at 
the Stout Research Centre in 1994. This paper was origi-
nally prepared for submission to the Waitangi Tribunal on 
behalf of the Taranaki claimants. 
Jane Austen's novel Sense and Sensibility opens with 
Mrs Dashwood's rich stepson and his wife considering 
what provision they should make for her and her three 
daughters, since the unexpected death of Mr Dashwood 
has left them with very little capital. The estate entails 
upon the brother and he has promised his late father 
to make sure they are comfortable. His initial impulse 
to give £3,000 to the three daughters is gradually whit-
tled down by his wife to helping them move house, 
giving them some furniture, and sending occasional 
presents of money, fish and game.' The history of gov-
ernment funding of Maori initiatives has exhibited 
rather the same pattern with an initial generosity giv-
ing way to niggardliness. 
In this paper I intend to draw together two themes 
- the promises that were made to Maori tribes in the 
period from 1986 to 1989 and how these have been 
implemented in the following years, and to make some 
recommendations on how Treaty claims might be 
funded. 
FUNDING THE DEPARTMENT OF MAORI AFFAIRS 
Up until 1929 the Department essentially existed to 
service the Native Land Purchase Board, the Native 
Land Court and the Maori Land Boards, and to admin-
ister the £7,000 for native purposes in the Civil List2 
Its role dramatically changed in 1928 when Ngata be-
came Native Minister and inaugurated Maori land de-
velopment. Although the Development Schemes ab-
sorbed the bulk of funding and the new staff appoint-
ments, Ngata wanted a wider role for the Department 
in encouraging Maori economic and social develop-
ments and his actual schemes aimed for what could be 
called community development.3 As a result of his ini-
tiatives the funding of the Department jumped from a 
lowly 0.2% of government expenditure in 1929 to 1.29% 
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in 1931. Though there were slight drops in 1935 and 
1936, the new Labour government was committed to 
maintaining the Development Schemes to promote 
Maori employment and expanded the Department's 
role by adding a housing function. This caused the 
Department's vote to reach the twentieth century his-
toric high of 1.95% of government expenditure in 1940. 
When I first discussed this paper with the Taranaki 
claimants I had an impression that there was a pattern 
of declines and recovery in government expenditure, 
depending on the anxiety of the Government of the 
day to resolve Maori problems and therefore be will-
ing to initiate new programmes and expand existing 
ones. Though the figures do show some yo-yo effects, 
with recoveries under Hanan, because of his housing 
and relocation programmes from 1961 to 1963, under 
Matiu Rata in 1974-76, and again under Koro Wetere 
from 1986 to 1990, an analysis of the long term trends 
shows that the Government's willingness to provide 
funding for the positive initiatives promoted through 
the Department has been in steady decline from the 
1940s:' 
Department of Maori Affairs 
Gross Expenditure by decade 
as a percentage of 
Gross Government Expenditure 1931-1990 
Decade Average% Miiori as a% 
over decade of total population' 
1931-1940 1.284 5.2 
1941-1950 0.8 5.8 
1951-1960 0.88 6.3 
1961-1970 0.582 7.5 
1971-1980 0.307 8.6 
1981-1990 0.352 8.9 
Average expenditure 1931-1990: 0.7% 
This analysis shows how the percentage allocated to 
the Department has been steadily reduced from 1941 
onwards despite growth in the Maori population. It 
also explains the high regard in which Labour even in 
opposition was held by the Maori community, and the 
unprecedented loyalty given to the Labour candidates 
in the Maori seats for 50 years until Northern Maori's 
defection in 1993. National in contrast was seen to be 
largely indifferent. 
I should add that this analysis must not be con-
strued as criticism or an attack on the present Ministry 
of Maori Development (Te Puni Kokiri). In its briefing 
paper to the new Minister in 1993 the Ministry pro-
tested strongly about the shrinkage in its vote.' 
I have not analysed the figures for the fiscal years 
from 1990/91 to 1995/96- because of the great changes 
in government account and in institutional arrange-
ments it is hard to draw comparisons with earlier fig-
ures. I note however that in the 1995/96 budget the 
Ministry of Maori Development's appropriations have 
fallen to $48.4m which is only 0.13% of government 
revenue so there appears to have been no reversal of 
the trend. This incidentally is a lower level of expendi-
ture than in the 1920s. 
The figures in the table, of course, do not capture _ 
total expenditure on Maori. Even in 1931, both the 
Health Department and the Education Department had 
significant Maori programmes within their vote. How-
ever the problem with both these Departments was 
that they tended to be passive in their handling of 
Maori issues, and in the early decades were even de-
pendent on funding through the Native Purposes Civil 
List and Maori Purposes Fund Board. Though Maori 
education became something of an issue in the late 
Above: Taranaki Maori at Parliament in September 1975, 
petitioning the Prime Minister (Bill Rowling) for compen-
sation for confiscated land. Evening Post. 
1950s and the Education Department gnawed on the 
issue like a dog on a bone, the most obvious result was 
a series of reports, while the situation failed to im-
prove. The most notable initiatives- the Maori Educa-
tion Foundation and Kohanga Reo - owed more to 
Maori Affairs Department than the Education Depart-
ment. 
By starving the Department of Maori Affairs of 
funding the government was also putting a cap on 
new initiatives to try to solve the emerging problems 
and dissatisfactions of the period after 1968. 
The great advantage the old Department of Maori 
Affairs brought to any problem was that it could ana-
lyse it in a holistic way and come up with lateral solu-
tions. Other government agencies were constrained by 
their narrower brief and could only deal with prob-
lems that were directly related to the programme. La-
bour Department, faced with rapidly growing Maori 
unemployment, could not propose policies to directly 
influence the educational under achievement and fam-
ily problems that were a significant factor in Maori 
unemployment. 
Again I should note that since the new educational 
reforms, the Ministry of Education has taken a very 
active approach to fostering Maori language teaching 
and improving Maori educational performance. The 
new philosophy of educational management also gives 
Maori parents much more direct control than in the 
past. Yet there remains the problem that unlike the old 
Department which was able to take a holistic view of 
Maori problems, current government departments have 
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strictly limited spheres of operation and cannot make 
a comparable impact. 
There is another important point to notice, too. 
Though the Department had promoted urbanisation it 
had not come up with new policies and programmes 
to help the economic and cultural development of new 
urban Maori. Even as late as the 1988 financial year, 
expenditure was hopelessly weighted in favour of the 
old centres of population. The two Auckland urban 
districts of Auckland and Wiri received $14.9m less in 
their budgets than their population and rate of unem-
ployment would have justified. Whangarei on the other 
hand received $7.5 m more than was justified and Gis-
borne and Rotorua $5.4m; a large proportion of money 
was also disbursed through Head Office.7 Although 
the department considered supplying significant pro-
grammes to rural districts and to Maori from those 
districts migrating to the cities, it did not take the next 
step of developing programmes to meet the needs of 
the urban generation. It would be fair to say that 
Kohanga Reo was the only programme that really ben-
efited urban areas as much as rural. The failure to 
allocate additional resources led, in my view, to a fos-
silisation of spending programmes with no incentive 
to devise new programmes to meet urban needs. 
While Maori frustration vented itself on other is-
sues, a hidden factor of this discontent must be consid-
ered to be the lack of properly funded programmes 
that attempted to meet Maori aspirations. When I first 
considered this paper I believed that the average ex-
penditure over the whole period would be close to 1% 
a year. That it was as low as 0.7% and had been de-
creasing since the 1931-1940 decade came as a major 
surprise to me. However, I think it also explains rather 
well the stagnation and frustrations of the 1970s and 
1980s in Maori communities. 
Looking at population growth and needs, it still 
seems to me that the required figure for a realistic 
funding was about 1%. Certainly it was in that magni-
tude during the periods when Maori Affairs was con-
sidered to be achieving results, 1931 to 1949 and again 
in the early 1960s (range was 0.73 to 0.89), and I con-
sider it is the baseline figure that is necessary to achieve 
noticeable improvements. 
MAORI ANALYSIS OF WHAT WAS WRONG 
I need not outline events in the turbulent period of the 
1970s and early 1980s. The important point here was 
that the new educated generation tried to analyse why 
Maori social and economic development had stagnated 
and what needed to be done to remedy the problems. 
New Zealand Maori Council (starting from Sir 
Henare Ngata's paper in 1971 that identified that acts 
that breached the Treaty) argued for the Treaty as an 
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ancestral initiative that still retained mana. In particu-
lar in Kaupapa: te whanga tuatahi the council argued 
that the treaty was the "origin of British sovereignty 
and constitutional government in New Zealand", and 
that by it "the Crown extends its protection over the 
Maori people and guarantees them their assets". Thus, 
the New Zealand Maori Council proposed an interpre-
tation of the Treaty from which we derive principles 
for determining codes of law on Maori lands and all 
other matters covered by the Treaty". In this way the 
New Zealand Maori Council recorded and shaped 
Maori views to the Treaty.• 
The new Labour Government (1984-1987) responded 
to this well-nigh universal request from the Maori com-
munity to honour the Treaty, by better funding the 
Waitangi Tribunal and by extending its jurisdiction to 
hear claims from 1840, declaring that they wished to 
resolve Maori grievances and honour the Treaty. 
I remember the high hopes that were held that the 
Waitangi Tribunal and the Treaty process would be a 
way of re-endowing Maori tribes. However, even at 
that time I had to point out in discussions that an 
undeveloped historiography and the natural cumber-
someness of any legal process would not make it a fast 
or easy process. I also wondered if it would benefit 
those tribes whose problems stemmed from their ge-
ography and the nature of social and economic devel-
opment, rather than from overt government wrongdo-
ing. 
As an aside it should also be noted that it took the 
Labour government a long time to really understand 
the implications of the process they had begun. The 
Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit was not established 
until early 1989, their fifth year in office, with the brief 
of coordinating the Government's policy on the Treaty. 
Later in 1989 it was given the task of conducting direct 
negotiations with claimants to honour the promise Ri-
chard Prebble had made to Tainui that they could have 
direct negotiations. At that point no provision had 
been made for claims settlements. Labour had not 
grasped the magnitude of the claims; it was thought 
that Cabinet would approve any settlements that were 
made and pay them through the Justice Department 
vote.• 
It seems the assumption was that settlements would 
be of the magnitude of the Orakei settlement; it was 
not appreciated that the large claims of Ngaitahu, 
Tainui and Taranaki would be in the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. 
NEGATIVE SPENDING AND WELFARE DEPENDENCY 
There was another strand of Maori opinion that wres-
tled with the apparent stagnation in economic and so-
cial advancement of the 1970s. Strangely enough, sys-
tematic government under-
funding was not identified 
as a problem, though the 
need for funding to be bet-
ter deployed was part of the 
debate. Indeed the only area 
where there was a strong 
feeling, was in a belief that 
Maori were systematically 
deprived of capital, so they 
could not build up worth-
while assets and become sig-
nificant players in the pri-
vate sector. There was agi-
tation for a Maori bank that 
could make large sums of 
money available to incorpo-
rations and Maori busi-
nesses. The MANA pro-
gramme and the Maori Development Corporation were 
the fruits of this concern. 
Instead, the debate tended to become focused on 
the mechanisms for delivering programmes and the 
need for better policies and programmes, and 
whether the present inadequate ones had locked 
Maori into a cycle of dependency and poverty. Im-
plicit in this was a criticism of the role and nature of 
the Department of Maori Affairs. The lack of Maori 
control over the delivery of services was also com-
mented on. 
The unanimously endorsed Kawenata (Covenant) 
of the Maori Economic Summit Conference (Hui 
Taumata) held in December 1984 captured very well 
the thinking of the period of the early 1980s. Three key 
problems were identified: 
1. Welfare dependency. Government policies were 
held to increasingly perpetuate this because these 
locked Maori into a welfare system that discour-
aged individual initiative and caused loss of group 
identity. 
2. Too many Maori failed to benefit from the educa- . 
tion system and the occupational opportunities it 
opened up. 
3. Government financial resources were locked up in 
negative spending patterns that did not assist eco-
nomic progress and therefore the attainment of eco-
nomic and social equality. 
It was estimated that some $360 million was tied up in 
this negative spending. As solutions the Kawenata pro-
posed: 
Above: Reinforcements approaching Wellington during the 
'Maori Tent Embassy' occupation of Parliament grounds 
in January 1976. Photograph Evening Post. 
1. A conscious attempt to restore self-determination 
by progressively moving the resources devoted to 
negative outcomes into the tribal system. 
2. The strengthening of the Maori tribal system to 
provide an environment for new social and eco-
nomic initiatives. 
3. A development decade to 'significantly reduce the 
imbalance between Maori and non-Maori in eco-
nomic, social and cultural terms'. 
Though ritual obeisance was made to the 'develop-
ment decade' from time to time by the Department 
and the Minister of Maori Affairs, the 'decade' smacked 
too much of indicative planning to fit in with the new 
mood of Rogernomics and so was never important in 
the development of policy. 
IWI DEVELOPMENT 
Dr Reedy, Secretary of Maori Affairs, was an enthusi-
ast for the tribal approach; the 1986 Annual Report of 
the Department advocated recognition of iwi and 
strengthening of the structures of whanau and hapii . 
The Department initiated the two new programmes, 
MANA and MACCESS, on a tribal basis. 
The fourth Labour Government of 1984-1990 
helped this approach by its desire to restructure the 
public service. Part of its policy was to separate com-
mercial, operational, policy and regulatory functions. 
The government was also concerned that the cen-
tralised, interventionist, welfare state model New 
Zealanders had become accustomed to was costly 
and imiffective. The Department, with its mixture of 
regulatory (Maori Land Court), commercial, opera-
tional (Maori Trustee, Maori Land Development, 
Housing) and policy functions, and a culture marked 
by a paternal, bureaucratic attitude, clearly did not 
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fit. In addition, its reputation had been blighted by 
the 'Hawaiian Loans Affair' and the Labour Cabinet 
had some desire to get rid of it. 
The new emphasis on efficiency, accountability and 
( most attractive of all from a Maori viewpoint) devo-
lution, offered new opportunities for iwi development 
because it meant shifting responsibility for the deliv-
ery of services from centralised structures. 
On 24 June 1987 Cabinet agreed that to achieve a 
true partnership between the Government and the 
Maori people, there had to be a devolution of respon-
sibility to the Maori people themselves for the man-
agement of government programmes. Government pro-
posals took the form of a discussion document He 
Tirohanga Rangapil (Partnership Perspectives) . This 
emphasised partnership with iwi organisations in the 
development and operation of policies. It proposed 
establishing a new Ministry responsible for Maori 
policy to act as a control department on all Maori is-
sues, in a role similar to Treasury and the State Serv-
ices Commission. The Department of Maori Affairs 
was to be phased out and its operational programmes 
transferred to mainstream departments; these in turn 
were to improve their responsiveness on Maori issues. 
There was extensive consultation in a series of 55 
hui. These showed Maori were deeply opposed to the 
abolition of the Department of Maori Affairs and con-
cerned with the mainstreaming of programmes because 
they felt mainstream departments would continue to 
be unresponsive to Maori needs. 
In November 1988 the government issued a policy 
statement called He Urupare Rangapil (Partnership Re-
sponse). The Ministry of Maori Affairs would remain, 
but the operational sections of Maori Affairs would be 
restructured into the Iwi Transition Agency. The new 
Agency would exist for five years to help iwi develop 
their operational base so that they would be better 
placed to receive programmes from the mainstream 
departments. The Maori Land Court would be trans-
ferred to the Justice Department. A Runanga Iwi Act 
was passed to help create legal entities from tradi-
tional tribal structures and to allow the Maori Land 
Court to resolve disagreements." Two contemporary 
references from semi-official sources sum up the easy 
optimism of this period: 
1. The Board of Maori Affairs was disbanded. Pro-
grammes that were previously under board control 
such as Mana Business Enterprises and Maori Ac-
cess Schemes are maintained by Te Tira Ahu Iwi, 
until iwi assume control. 11 
2. The long-term demand of the Maori people that the 
rangatiratanga promised in the Treaty of Waitangi 
be honoured is met by the empowering of the iwi 
through legislation and through the resources of 
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the Iwi Transition Agency and other government 
agencies." 
DEMISE OF A POLICY 
This was not to follow. Labour was a dying govern-
ment and the Department was not abolished until 30 
September 1989. Labour was replaced by National in 
October 1990. The new Minister, Winston Peters, sum-
marily repealed the Runanga a Iwi Act. He issued a 
policy statement called Ka Awatea (It is Day) which was 
long on exhortation and short on practicalities. One 
concrete recommendation was for the creation of a 
Ministry .of Maori Development that would handle 
policy, operations, auditing, liaison and strategic plan-
ning. The report seems to have assumed a continued 
existence for the Ministry of Maori Affairs and the Iwi 
Transition Agency since their Chief Executives were to 
be part of a Management of Change Executive13 
In the policy battles that took place over the report, 
the opportunity was taken to abolish both the Ministry 
and the Iwi Transition Agency and to replace them 
with a new Ministry of Maori Development. This was 
inaugurated on 1 January 1992. 
Since then there has been a policy of constantly 
reducing the Ministry's budget by removing pro-
grammes, from the high point of the 1989-90 financial 
year (when $254.5m was budgeted) to the 1995-96 fi-
nancial year (when its budget has been reduced to 
$48.34m). 
At the flax roots I understand that the promised 
transfer of assets to the iwi has not taken place. The 
Taranaki Trust Board received an initial establishment 
grant of $100,000 from the Iwi Transition Agency and 
since then it has lost MANA and MACCESS funding 
as both programmes have been disestablished.14 
The claims process has however proved more ro-
bust, and the government has continued its commit-
ment to settling Maori grievances. It has, of course, 
become clear that the settlements will be large. The 
problem of funding this has become an urgency for 
Cabinet and the fiscal envelope has been the result. 
There seems to be a symmetry in the timings, that 
as the Ministry and Iwi funding is being shrunk, the 
Government is finding another large sum of money to 
meet Treaty claims through the fiscal envelope. Though, 
alas, there is not an exact equivalence (since the $200m 
saved from departmental funding has not been wholly 
redirected to. meet Treaty claims) the Government, as I 
understand the mechanism, is committing itself to 
spending $lOOm a year. Fiscal constraint has also been 
met- the Government has saved $lOOm. 
It is hard not to feel that the essential Maori experi-
ence of government never changes - Machiavellian 
and intrinsically niggardly. 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
I have taken this long discursion because I want to 
remind readers that the Treaty claimE-process and the 
iwi development process were inextdcably linked in 
Maori minds with a re-endowment of the iwi, so that 
they would have structures and resources to offer a 
better future to their people. The governmenfha_s im-
plicitly abandoned the iwi development policy a11d 
taken no steps to provide through mainstream depart-
ments the funding that was promised to the iwi. I do 
not believe that you can solve problems by throwing 
money at them, but properly formulated policies not 
translated into well-resourced programmes are mere 
academic exercises. The Maori community has seen 
few such programmes since the Hunn Report (1961), 
and if the Maori situation and race relations are to 
improve then there must be a real long-term financial 
commitment by government. The fiscal envelope does 
not represent such a commitment. Further, the sum 
and the method has proved unacceptable to the Maori 
people and irritating to the Pakeha majority. 
Time has prevented me from analysing the annual 
accounts of the Iwi Transition Agency, and the Minis-
try of Maori Affairs between 1990 and the 1995/96 
budget year to see what the exact deficit is. However 
looking at the contraction in spending I am left with 
the feeling that the fiscal envelope has been funded by 
the savings from the original vote Maori Affairs: 
Amount available for Maori and Treaty claims 








It seems to me that another approach could be for 
the Government to acknowledge that it has tradition-
ally allocated 0.7% of its expenditure to Maori pur-
poses, that this amount was less than circumstances 
required, and that it wou~d be prepared to allocate 1% 
of its revenue for Maori purposes. The first call, sub-
ject to Maori approval, would be to finance Te Puni 
Kokiri, then to fund research on Waitangi claims, and 
finally to meet Maori claims. This would continue so 
long as there was a backlog of unsettled claims. An 
examination of Government finances suggests that on 
this basis the amount for 1996 would have been $348m, 
not a mere $48.34m. 
I have suggested that revenue rather than expenditure 
be the base of the budget because it seems to better fit 
the fiscal discipline New Zealand is trying to achieve. 
A continuing allocation overcomes the resentment felt 
about trying to put a deadline on claims. This arrange-
ment seems to me more manageable than the unprec-
edented multi- year appropriation that the Govern-
ment has had to build into this year's budget. It has 
the advantages of fitting within the pattern of previ-
ous government expenditure and providing a proper 
level of funding for Treaty claims. 
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